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ABSTRACT: Studies of the role of the monkey hippocampus in spatial
learning and memory, however few, have reliably produced inconsistent
results. Whereas the role of the hippocampus in spatial learning and
memory has been clearly established in rodents, studies in nonhuman
primates have made a variety of claims that range from the involvement
of the hippocampus in spatial memory only at relatively longer memory
delays, to no role for the hippocampus in spatial memory at all. In
contrast, we have shown that selective damage restricted to the hippo-
campus (CA regions) prevents the learning or use of allocentric, spatial
relational representations of the environment in freely behaving adult
monkeys tested in an open-ﬁeld arena. In this commentary, we discuss
a unifying framework that explains these apparently discrepant results
regarding the role of the monkey hippocampus in spatial learning and
memory. We describe clear and strict criteria to interpret the ﬁndings
from previous studies and guide future investigations of spatial memory
in monkeys. Speciﬁcally, we afﬁrm that, as in the rodent, the primate
hippocampus is critical for spatial relational learning and memory, and
in a time-independent manner. We describe how claims to the contrary
are the result of experimental designs that fail to recognize, and control
for, egocentric (hippocampus-independent) and allocentric (hippo-
campus-dependent) spatial frames of reference. Finally, we conclude
that the available data demonstrate unequivocally that the central role
of the hippocampus in allocentric, spatial relational learning and
memory is conserved among vertebrates, including nonhuman primates.
KEY WORDS: space; episodic; parahippocampal; comparative;
semantic
MEMORY AND THE HIPPOCAMPUS
Since the ﬁrst report describing the profoundly amnesic patient H.M.
(Scoville and Milner, 1957), whose amnesic syndrome resulted from
bilateral temporal lobe resection, researchers have worked to deﬁne the
precise role of the medial temporal lobe structures in learning and mem-
ory. Although there is still signiﬁcant debate about the exact nature of
the cognitive processes subserved by these structures (Brown and Aggle-
ton, 2001; Eichenbaum et al., 2007; Morris, 2007; Squire et al., 2007;
Bird and Burgess, 2008), a prominent theory advo-
cates that the hippocampal formation (comprising the
dentate gyrus, hippocampus, subiculum, presubicu-
lum, parasubiculum, and entorhinal cortex) (Lavenex
and Amaral, 2000; Amaral and Lavenex, 2007) is
essential for the processing of relational information
(Cohen and Eichenbaum, 1993; Eichenbaum, 1999;
Buckmaster et al., 2004).
One aspect of hippocampal function that has been
studied extensively in rodents is its role in spatial rela-
tional learning and memory, that is, the formation
and use of allocentric representations of space
(O’Keefe and Nadel, 1978; Nadel and Hardt, 2004).
Indeed, numerous studies have linked the integrity of
the hippocampus to a rodent’s ability to learn and
remember a particular location in the absence of local
cues marking that location, that is, in relation to dis-
tant environmental cues (Morris et al., 1982; Nadel,
1991; Schenk et al., 1995). Electrophysiological stud-
ies have further implicated the rodent hippocampus in
spatial learning and memory (O’Keefe and Dostrov-
sky, 1971; O’Keefe, 2007).
SPATIAL MEMORY IN MONKEYS
Given our extensive understanding of the role of
the hippocampal formation in spatial relational learn-
ing and memory in the rodent, and our obvious desire
and need to understand the role of the human hippo-
campus in learning and memory for clinical reasons,
it is clear that nonhuman primates are a crucial group
in which experimental analyses of hippocampal func-
tion must be thoroughly investigated. Nevertheless,
comparable studies of the role of the monkey hippo-
campus in spatial learning and memory are few, and
their ﬁndings often contradictory. For example,
whereas some experiments report that hippocampal-
lesioned monkeys exhibit impaired performance in
various spatial memory tasks (Parkinson et al., 1988;
Angeli et al., 1993; Beason-Held et al., 1999; Alvar-
ado et al., 2002; Hampton et al., 2004; Banta Lave-
nex et al., 2006; Bachevalier and Nemanic, 2008),
other experiments have failed to show any spatial
memory impairments at all (Murray and Mishkin,
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1998; Malkova and Mishkin, 2003; Hampton et al., 2004;
Bachevalier and Nemanic, 2008). These lesion studies stand in
contrast to electrophysiological studies that support the hypoth-
esis that the monkey hippocampus is involved in spatial learn-
ing and memory (Rolls et al., 1989; Feigenbaum and Rolls,
1991; Ono et al., 1991; Rolls and O’Mara, 1995; Georges-
Francois et al., 1999; Hori et al., 2003; Rolls and Xiang,
2006), as well as functional magnetic resonance imaging and
virtual reality experiments that similarly implicate the human
hippocampal formation in spatial learning and memory (e.g.,
Bird and Burgess, 2008).
Indeed, the many incongruities in the literature might lead
to the conclusion that the primate hippocampus functions in a
manner fundamentally different from that of the rodent, a hy-
pothesis that has drastic consequences for our understanding of
the function of the human hippocampal formation. Although
this conclusion is neither very satisfying nor parsimonious,
there is, to date, no coherent interpretation of the discrepant
ﬁndings reported in the literature. Recently, however, we have
conducted a series of experiments using a novel experimental
paradigm designed to assess the role of the monkey hippocam-
pal formation in spatial relational learning and memory (Banta
Lavenex et al., 2006; Lavenex and Banta Lavenex, 2006; Lave-
nex et al., 2007b). Our experiments have shown that the pri-
mate hippocampus is unequivocally involved in the processing
of allocentric, spatial relational information, thus conﬁrming its
conserved function across mammalian species (Banta Lavenex
et al., 2006). In this commentary, we discuss a unifying frame-
work that explains the apparently discrepant results regarding
the role of the monkey hippocampus in spatial learning and
memory. We describe clear and strict criteria to interpret the
ﬁndings from previous studies and guide future investigations
of spatial memory in monkeys.
DISTINCT SPATIAL FRAMES OF REFERENCE
In their seminal work ‘‘The hippocampus as a cognitive
map,’’ O’Keefe and Nadel (1978) elucidate the arguments in
favor of the existence of two separate and distinct spatial
systems: (1) An egocentric, or viewpoint-dependent, representa-
tion of space deﬁned in a frame of reference centered on a
subject’s own body position; and (2) an allocentric, or view-
point-independent, representation of space deﬁned in a frame
of reference centered on the objects constituting the environ-
ment, and therefore independent from the subject’s own loca-
tion or orientation. It has been previously demonstrated in
rodents, and is now well-accepted, that allocentric behavioral
strategies are critically dependent on the integrity of the hippo-
campus (Morris et al., 1982; Nadel, 1991; Schenk et al., 1995;
Morris, 2007). In contrast, egocentric behavioral strategies are
not impacted by hippocampal damage (Nadel, 1991; Schenk
et al., 1995; Nadel and Hardt, 2004). As we will describe below,
critical evaluation of the tasks used previously by other researchers
reveals that the discrepancies in the monkey hippocampus
literature can be clearly and consistently explained as a failure to
recognize and control for the fact that monkeys have normally
access to both egocentric (hippocampus-independent) and allocen-
tric (hippocampus-dependent) representations of space (Nadel and
Hardt, 2004). Experiments separating these two distinct spatial
frames of reference, however, are absolutely critical in order to de-
cipher the exact role of the primate medial temporal lobe struc-
tures in spatial learning and memory (Banta Lavenex et al., 2006).
In this commentary, we review the ﬁndings of select studies
that have investigated the role of the monkey medial temporal
lobe structures in spatial learning and memory. Speciﬁcally, we
describe in detail four recently employed behavioral paradigms,
and explain how particular ﬂaws in the conceptual design of
these studies have led to inconsistencies in their results when
taken together, as well as to ﬂawed interpretations as to the
role of the monkey hippocampus in spatial learning and mem-
ory. We also describe our experimental paradigm that has
yielded experimental results consistent with a large body of
well-established work in rodents. Finally, we identify the spe-
ciﬁc factors that are critical to recognize and incorporate into
any experiment, aiming to deﬁne the role of particular brain
structures in spatial learning and memory.
THE DELAYED-NONMATCHING-TO-LOCATION
PARADIGM
We begin with a description of the paradigm that is most of-
ten used to test spatial memory in monkeys, namely, the
delayed-nonmatching-to-location (DNML) task performed in
the Wisconsin General Testing Apparatus (WGTA). Figure 1
illustrates the experimental apparatus, which typically employs
a tray containing three wells that is positioned in front of a
cage in which the monkey is placed during testing. In the
standard version of the task, during what is referred to as the
sample phase, the monkey is ﬁrst shown one object that is
placed in one well location (Fig. 1A). In the test phase, after a
deﬁned delay, the monkey is shown two identical objects: one
in the previous location, and the other in a new location. As
this task rewards the novel location (DNML), the monkey will
ﬁnd a reward by choosing (i.e., lifting) the object in the novel
location. However, in order to choose the novel location, the
monkey must be able to remember where the object was
located during the sample phase (Fig. 1A).
A number of studies have employed the DNML task as a
general assay for hippocampal function (e.g., Parkinson et al.,
1988; Angeli et al., 1993; Murray and Mishkin, 1998; Malkova
and Mishkin, 2003). Researchers have reasoned that this is a
spatial task, since the monkey is required to remember and
identify the location where an object was previously seen.
Researchers further reasoned that since the hippocampal forma-
tion has been shown to be responsible for processing spatial in-
formation in rodents, monkeys with hippocampal lesions
should be impaired at performing the DNML task. As reasona-
ble as this logic may seem, studies using the DNML paradigm
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have failed to show decreased performance of monkeys with
hippocampal lesions as compared to controls [(Murray and
Mishkin, 1998); using a 10-well tray, but with only two, rather
than three, potential locations during sample and test trials],
whereas ‘‘extra-hippocampal’’ lesions impaired performance
(Parkinson et al., 1988; Angeli et al., 1993). How can these
experimental results be explained?
In experiments employing the DNML task as described
above, it is clear that researchers have neglected two critical
points. First, both allocentric and egocentric spatial frames of
reference can be used to encode and remember the location of
a particular object placed on the tray: As illustrated in Figure
1, a normal subject can remember the location of the object
based on its relative position deﬁned in relation to other
objects constituting the environment (Fig. 1B), that is, in an
allocentric spatial frame of reference. However, a normal sub-
ject can also remember the location of the object based on its
position relative to its own body position, for example, on the
left, in the center, or on the right (Fig. 1C), that is in an ego-
centric spatial frame of reference. Second, as previously
described, rodent studies have shown that egocentric strategies
are not dependent on the integrity of the hippocampus.
Considering these two points, it is completely understandable,
if not predictable, that the DNML task fails to distinguish con-
trol monkeys from those with hippocampal lesions. Indeed, the
experiment by Murray and Mishkin (1998), which tested mon-
keys that had received lesions conﬁned to the amygdala and
hippocampal formation found preserved performance on the
DNML task. In contrast, two studies which examined DNML
performance in monkeys that had received ‘‘extra-hippocampal’’
lesions that included the parahippocampal cortex found
impaired performance (Parkinson et al., 1988; Angeli et al.,
1993). Taken together, these experiments thus argue strongly
that the DNML task performed in a WGTA can be solved by
using a solely egocentric frame of reference; and lesions of the
parahippocampal cortex, and not lesions of the hippocampus,
are responsible for impairing performance on tasks such as the
DNML that rely on an egocentric coding of space.
In a modiﬁed version of the DNML task (Fig. 2), Malkova
and Mishkin (2003) evaluated one-trial memory for object-
place associations after either lesion of the hippocampus or the
posterior parahippocampal region in the monkey. The task pro-
ceeded in the following manner: During the sample phase, two
different objects were placed over two different wells of a three-
well tray (Figs. 2A,B). In the test phase, after a 6-s delay, one
of the two sample objects, together with its exact duplicate,
FIGURE 1. Schematic representation of the delayed-nonmatch-
ing-to-location (DNML) task performed in the Wisconsion Gen-
eral Testing Apparatus (WGTA). (A) Sample phase: an object is
placed in one-well location of a three-well tray positioned in front
of the cage in which the monkey is placed during testing. (B) After
a deﬁned delay, the subject must choose the object that has been
placed in the novel location to obtain a food reward. The location
of the object presented during the sample phase can be encoded
based on its relation to other objects constituting the environment.
This corresponds to an allocentric coding of space. (C) The loca-
tion of the object presented during the sample phase can also be
encoded based on its position relative to the subject’s own body
position, which in this particular case is on the left. This corre-
sponds to an egocentric coding of space. [Color ﬁgure can be
viewed in the online issue, which is available at www.interscience.
wiley.com.]
FIGURE 2. Schematic representation of the tasks used by Mal-
kova and Mishkin (2003). An unlike pair of unrewarded objects is
presented in the sample phase. In the test phase, one of the two
sample objects together with its exact duplicate are presented
either over the same two foodwells that were used in the sample
phase (A: Object-place trials), or over one of the foodwells used
during the sample phase and over the third, previously unused
foodwell (B: Place trials). In both conditions, however, the loca-
tion of the objects presented during the sample phase can be
encoded and remembered in an egocentric spatial frame of refer-
ence. Thus, in both the object-place and the place trials, the mem-
ory of a simple association (i.e., cylinder-left, or block-left, respec-
tively) is sufﬁcient to solve the task. [Color ﬁgure can be viewed in
the online issue, which is available at www.interscience.wiley.com.]
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were presented either over the same two wells that were used
during the sample phase (object-place trials; Fig. 2A), or over
one of the wells used during the sample phase and over the
third, previously unused well (place trials; Fig. 2B). Twelve of
each type of trial were intermixed within a daily session, with
an intertrial interval of 15 s. The authors reasoned that the
monkeys could solve the object-place trials only by associating
each sample object with its location, whereas monkeys could
solve the place trials simply by remembering the locations of
the two sample objects irrespective of the identity of the object.
With respect to this experiment, it is critical to recognize that
the spatial location of these objects can be encoded in an
entirely egocentric spatial frame of reference. For both the
object-place and the place trials, monkeys need only to encode
and remember the location of an object that was seen just 6 s
before as deﬁned in relation to their own body position, that
is, on the left, at the center, or on the right. Moreover, in the
test phase of the place trials, monkeys can even ignore the
identity of the object and simply select whatever location had
an object in the sample phase (or alternatively, by remembering
the location of the uncovered well during the sample phase and
then avoiding it during the test phase). Again, however, this
can be done using a uniquely egocentric frame of reference.
Thus, in both the object-place and the place trials, the memory
of a simple association (i.e., cylinder-left or block-left, respec-
tively) is sufﬁcient to solve the task. Consequently, monkeys do
not need to rely on an allocentric, spatial relational representa-
tion of the environment to solve the task, and even monkeys
with selective lesion of brain areas involved in the elaboration
of such representations (i.e., the hippocampus) should be able
to perform the task. In contrast, monkeys with lesions of the
cortical structures involved in the egocentric coding of space
(i.e., the parahippocampal cortex) should not be able to per-
form the task. Not surprisingly, this is precisely what Malkova
and Mishkin’s experiment has shown: Selective hippocampal
lesions had no effect on either task, whereas lesions of the para-
hippocampal cortex impacted both types of trials (Malkova and
Mishkin, 2003). These ﬁndings are also consistent with the
ﬁndings described above from these same researchers reporting
the absence of spatial memory deﬁcits in the DNML task fol-
lowing selective hippocampal lesions (Murray and Mishkin,
1998), but strong impairments following lesions that included
the hippocampus and the parahippocampal cortex (Parkinson
et al., 1988; Angeli et al., 1993).
In another study, Alvarado et al. (2002) evaluated spatial
memory performance in a WGTA with a testing tray consisting
of nine wells arranged in rows of three (Fig. 3A). Plaques were
used to cover one of the nine wells during the sample phase,
and two of the nine wells (the previously sampled but now
unrewarded well, and a newly rewarded well) during the test
phase. As we would predict, based on the fact that animals had
access to both egocentric and allocentric spatial frames of refer-
ence to solve the task, performance of hippocampal-lesioned
monkeys (assessed across several delays from 30 to 600 s) was
well above chance level in all testing conditions. However, de-
spite the fact that an ANOVA failed to demonstrate an interac-
tion between groups and delays, the published data indicate
that the difference between controls and hippocampal-lesioned
monkeys was greater at longer delays (group differences: 30 s:
t(6) 5 3.02, P 5 0.0233; 60 s: t(6) 5 2.1, P 5 0.0735; [aver-
age 30–60 s delays: t(6) 5 2.73, P 5 0.0342]; 120 s: t(6) 5
3.16, P 5 0.0195; 600 s: t(6) 5 4.23, P 5 0.0055; [average
120–600 s delays: t(6) 5 6.41, P 5 0.0007]). These ﬁndings
FIGURE 3. Schematic representation of three different tasks
used to test spatial memory in a WGTA with a large number of
wells. (A) Experimental design used by Alvarado et al. (2002) for a
delayed-nonmatching-to-location (DNML) task. The testing tray
(30 3 63 cm) consisted of nine wells arranged in rows of three
(10-cm apart, center to center). (B) Experimental design used by
Beason-Held et al. (1999) for a spatial delayed recognition span
(DRS) task. The exact dimensions of the design are not reported.
(C) Experimental design used by Buckmaster et al. (2004) to eval-
uate the monkey’s reliance on different ‘‘spatial relational frames of
references’’ in the performance of a spatial DRS task. The stimu-
lus-tray measured 26.5 3 68.5 cm and contained 3 3 6 5 18 pos-
sible locations (with a 8.5- and 8-cm spacing in the vertical and
horizontal dimensions, respectively). The ﬁgure on the left repre-
sents a standard trial, during which the monkey is rewarded for
choosing a sweet cookie (black) presented in a novel location,
while identical, but bitter cookies (gray) are placed at previously
rewarded locations. The ﬁgure on the right represents a probe trial
during which two different spatial frames of references are put
into conﬂict. Again, black circles represent sweet cookies. If the
monkey uses a ‘‘local’’ spatial strategy, then the relative spatial
location of the cookie designated by the black arrows, as deﬁned
in relation to the other previously rewarded locations, predicts
that it should be chosen by the monkey since it is a novel, previ-
ously unrewarded location. However, if the monkey uses a ‘‘global’’
strategy, then the spatial location of the cookie designated by the
red arrow, as deﬁned in relation to the global testing environment
that includes both egocentric and allocentric frames of references,
predicts that this position should be avoided by the monkey since
it is a previously rewarded location. See main text for a detailed
description of the procedures. [Color ﬁgure can be viewed in the
online issue, which is available at www.interscience.wiley.com.]
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highlight two important points with respect to the DNML
task: First, if an egocentric representation of space can be used
to solve the task, hippocampal-lesioned monkeys will be able to
perform above chance level, even though their performance
might be different from that of controls who can beneﬁt from
the additional information provided by an allocentric, spatial
relational representation. Second, whereas an egocentric repre-
sentation of space can sustain performance over short delays, it
is less reliable over longer delays. This issue will be further dis-
cussed in the context of another series of experiments.
In sum, it is clear that experiments employing the DNML
task in the WGTA, which fail to control for the fact that mon-
keys have access to both egocentric and allocentric strategies in
order to solve the task, will produce results that are contradictory
and difﬁcult, if not impossible, to interpret (Belcher et al., 2006).
THE VISUAL-PAIRED COMPARISON PARADIGM
Another experimental paradigm used to investigate the spe-
ciﬁc contribution of the medial temporal lobe structures in spa-
tial memory is the visual-paired comparison (VPC) task (Bach-
evalier and Nemanic, 2008). The chief difference between the
VPC and the DNML tasks is the behavioral measure used to
infer the cognitive and memory processes evaluated by the two
different tasks. In the DNML task, for example, monkeys are
required to choose, by grasping, one of several objects in order
to obtain a reward. By analyzing the explicit choices of control
versus experimentally lesioned subjects, researchers can infer the
role of particular brain structures in performing the task. In the
VPC task, in contrast, monkeys are not required to respond in
an explicit manner (i.e., by grasping), but rather their visual scan-
ning pattern and preferential looking time (i.e., time spent look-
ing at one stimulus or location vs. another) are considered by the
experimenter to infer the information that control versus experi-
mentally lesioned monkeys are attending to and remembering,
and thus the brain structures implicated in performing the task.
Nevertheless, the same limitations that apply to the DNML
task with regard to testing spatial memory, speciﬁcally the
monkey’s ability to rely on allocentric and egocentric informa-
tion to solve the task, also apply to the VPC task. Bachevalier
and Nemanic (2008) tested monkeys in two variations of the
VPC task: the spatial-location condition (Fig. 4A) and the
object-in-place condition (Fig. 4B). In the spatial-location con-
dition, an image is presented on a screen in front of the subject
during the sample phase. In the test phase, two images identical
to that presented in the sample phase are shown on the screen,
one at the same location and one at a novel location. If the
monkey remembers the location of the image presented in the
sample phase, it should spend more time looking at the same
image presented in the novel location. However, similar to the
DNML, the location of the sample image on the screen can be
encoded and remembered using both egocentric (e.g., on the
right, center, or left of the monkey) as well as allocentric (i.e.,
in relation to other objects constituting the environment) spa-
tial frames of reference. It is therefore not surprising that hip-
pocampal-lesioned monkeys spent the same percentage of time
looking at the image appearing in the novel location as sham-
operated controls [i.e., no effect of hippocampal lesion; Fig. 5
of (Bachevalier and Nemanic, 2008)]. In contrast, monkeys
with aspiration lesions of parahippocampal areas TH and TF
did not exhibit a preference for the image presented in the
novel location. Again, these ﬁndings provide further corroborat-
ing evidence that the hippocampus is necessary for the allocen-
tric, relational coding of space, whereas the parahippocampal
cortex is necessary for the egocentric coding of space.
FIGURE 4. Schematic representation of the visual-paired-com-
parison (VPC) tasks used by Bachevalier and Nemanic (2008). (A)
Spatial-location condition: an image is presented on a screen in
front of the subject during the sample phase. In the test phase,
two images identical to that presented previously are shown on the
screen, one at the same location as in the sample phase, and one
at a novel location. (B) Object-in-place condition: an image con-
taining a group of ﬁve objects is presented in the center of the
screen during the sample phase. In the test phase, the same array
and a novel array with the same objects differently arranged are
presented simultaneously on the left and right side of the screen,
respectively. (C) Control condition: an image containing a group
of ﬁve objects is presented in the center of the screen during the
sample phase. In the test phase, the same array and a novel array
with one of the objects replaced are presented simultaneously on
the left and right side of the screen, respectively. [Color ﬁgure can
be viewed in the online issue, which is available at www.
interscience.wiley.com.]
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In the object-in-place condition (Fig. 4B), monkeys are ﬁrst
shown a group of ﬁve objects that are presented over a white
rectangular background centered on the screen (the sample
array). For the test phase, the monkeys are simultaneously pre-
sented the sample array alongside a novel array that consists of
the same ﬁve objects, but with the location of those familiar
objects within the array rearranged. As before, if monkeys are
able to distinguish between the sample and rearranged arrays,
they should spend more time looking at the novel (rearranged)
array. First, it is important to note that an egocentric spatial
frame of reference cannot be used to determine the position of
the array of objects presented during the sample phase, because
it is ﬁrst shown in the center of the screen and then either on
the left or on the right of the screen during the test phase.
Instead, the location of each object within the array must be
deﬁned in relation to that of the other objects constituting the
array (i.e., its local environment). Indeed, this is the deﬁnition
of a spatial relational representation, which codes the location
of objects in relation to one another and independently from
the position of the observer. In this experiment, Bachevalier
and Nemanic found that whereas control monkeys looked pref-
erentially at the reorganized array of objects, neither hippocam-
pal-lesioned nor parahippocampal-lesioned monkeys were able
to discriminate the novel array [Fig. 6 of (Bachevalier and
Nemanic, 2008)]. Importantly, in their control task, in which
one of the ﬁve objects was replaced by another, but the conﬁg-
uration of the objects relative to one another remained the
same (Fig. 4C), hippocampal-lesioned monkeys exhibited the
same preference for the array containing the new object as con-
trol monkeys [Fig. 7 of (Bachevalier and Nemanic, 2008)].
These ﬁndings conﬁrm that neither simple visual discrimina-
tion nor object memory is impaired in hippocampal- or para-
hippocampal-lesioned monkeys.
Bachevalier and Nemanic considered their results on the
object-in-place condition as inconsistent with those reported by
Mishkin and colleagues in the object-location condition of the
DNML (described above, which hippocampal-lesioned mon-
keys were able to solve). In an attempt to reconcile these two
ﬁndings, Bachevalier and Nemanic (2008) reasoned that the
fact that the DNML is a problem-solving task, requiring
explicit responses, and the VPC an incidental task, requiring
no explicit response, might explain the differences. In contrast,
we contend that although such differences might contribute to
a differential sensitivity of the tasks, the real difference between
these two tasks is their speciﬁcity. The spatial representations
under investigation in the two tasks are fundamentally differ-
ent, and the differential effect of hippocampal lesions can serve
to distinguish the two paradigms. In the DNML studies cited
above, the location of the different objects (maximum of three)
can be encoded in an egocentric spatial frame of reference (left,
center, or right; Figs. 1 and 2), similar to the spatial location
task as implemented in the VPC paradigm (left or right; Fig.
4A). In contrast, in the object-in-place condition of the VPC
task (Fig. 4B), the relative position of ﬁve different objects
must be encoded and remembered, a process that is clearly
relational in nature. It is therefore not surprising to observe
that, in this condition, hippocampal-lesioned monkeys failed to
exhibit a preference to look at the array containing the dis-
placed object(s).
This experiment further highlights another critical point
regarding the cognitive processes that subserve egocentric and
allocentric spatial coding. Because the elaboration of an allocen-
tric spatial relational representation requires, in part, the inte-
gration of egocentric spatial information processed by the para-
hippocampal cortex, allocentric representations are not possible
without egocentric input. This is supported by the ﬁnding that
monkeys with parahippocampal cortex lesion are also impaired
in the object-in-place condition of the VPC paradigm. In con-
trast, all current lesion studies indicate that egocentric represen-
tations persist even in the absence of allocentric processing (i.e.,
following selective hippocampal lesion). This hypothesis is sup-
ported by the fact that monkeys with hippocampal lesions were
able to solve the spatial location condition of Bachevalier and
Nemanic’s VPC paradigm, as well as Mishkin and colleagues’
object-location condition in the DNML paradigm.
THE DELAYED RECOGNITION SPAN
TASK PARADIGM
A third experimental paradigm used to investigate the role of
the monkey hippocampus in spatial memory is the delayed rec-
ognition span (DRS) task performed in a modiﬁed WGTA
with an 18-well tray (Fig. 3B; Beason-Held et al., 1999). In
the sample phase of this task, the monkey is presented with a
tray on which a disk covers one well. The monkey must dis-
place the disk in order to obtain a food reward. In the test
phase, after a 10-s interval, the monkey is presented with the
tray again, but this time there are two disks: one in the original
location, and a second disk in a novel location. The monkey is
required to displace the disk in the novel location in order to
obtain the food reward. Disks are added at novel rewarded
locations until the animal makes an error. The number of cor-
rect locations chosen before the error is committed constitutes
the recognition span score. Monkeys performed 10 trials per
day: Eight of the recognition spans were trial unique and two
of the recognition spans were ﬁxed sequences repeated twice
each day. When unique sequences were presented, hippocam-
pal-lesioned monkeys averaged 1.94 locations before they made
an error, whereas control monkeys averaged 2.42 locations.
When the repeated sequences were presented, hippocampal-
lesioned monkeys averaged 2.14 locations, whereas control
monkeys averaged 3.42 locations. Thus, although control mon-
keys exhibited surprisingly poor performance on this DRS task,
hippocampal-lesioned monkeys still performed signiﬁcantly
worse.
When looking at the 18-well tray it is easy, if not natural, to
divide the tray into three distinct parts: left, center, and right.
If this is the case, then a simple egocentric spatial representa-
tion can be used to solve the task for up to three locations.
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Indeed, the hippocampal-lesioned animals in their study
remembered an average of 1.94 and 2.14 locations (on unique
and repeated recognition spans, respectively). Whereas control
monkeys might have beneﬁted from an allocentric spatial rela-
tional representation of the disk locations to encode more reli-
ably previously rewarded locations, hippocampal-lesioned mon-
keys were still able to access an egocentric representation of
space to remember in which general area of the tray they had
previously found rewarded locations, and therefore identify
which disk covered the novel, rewarded location. Control mon-
keys also beneﬁted more from the repetition of the sequences
and improved their performance by 41% (as compared to that
observed with unique sequences), whereas hippocampal-
lesioned monkeys’ performance was only 10% higher with
repeated sequences. The repetition of the same sequence might
have beneﬁted control monkeys in their elaboration of a spatial
representation encoding the locations of the disks in relation to
one another.
As in the previously discussed studies, the main limitation of
this DRS task is the fact that both egocentric and allocentric
spatial representations could enable animals to solve the task,
and thus uncontrolled parameters of the task lead to a differen-
tial performance between hippocampal-lesioned and control
monkeys. It is also interesting to note that the overall low per-
formance exhibited by both groups of monkeys in this DRS
study could have been the result of the monkeys’ natural tend-
ency to rely on a win-stay strategy and therefore go back to
previously rewarded locations (Lavenex and Banta Lavenex,
2006), instead of choosing the novel rewarded location.
Finally, it is worth discussing a study by Buckmaster et al.
(2004) that used a modiﬁed version of the DRS task (Fig. 3C)
to evaluate the monkeys’ reliance on what these authors referred
to as different ‘‘spatial relational frames of reference.’’ On the
fourth location of a four-item DRS task, probe trials were
introduced that imposed a conﬂict between the relative spatial
relationships of the previously rewarded locations and their
location in relation to the distal environmental cues that com-
prised the global testing environment (i.e., the array of previ-
ously rewarded locations was moved to a different position on
the board). Experimental results showed that when faced with
this incoherency, control monkeys’ performance fell to chance,
suggesting that they were encoding both local relational infor-
mation (i.e., about the relative position of the previously
rewarded locations with respect to one another), as well as in-
formation deﬁning these locations in relation to the global test-
ing environment (i.e., the room). However, what the authors
failed to recognize was that because monkeys always
approached the tray from the same direction, the previously
rewarded locations could be deﬁned within the testing room
using both allocentric as well as egocentric spatial representa-
tions. Therefore, because the task failed to preclude the mon-
keys’ use of egocentric information, it cannot be considered
to have demonstrated their reliance on allocentric, spatial
relational representations of the environment to guide their
choices. Indeed, the fact that the monkeys reacted to the incoher-
ency between different sources of spatial information does not
indicate that they relied on any one particular source in order to
guide their choices in an explicit manner (e.g., Lavenex and
Schenk, 1996).
THE OPEN-FIELD DELAYED-MATCHING-TO-
LOCATION PARADIGM
A fourth experimental paradigm designed to evaluate the
role of the monkey hippocampus in spatial learning and mem-
ory was conceived by Hampton et al. (2004). This task is dif-
ferent from the three previously described experimental designs,
because tethered monkeys were allowed to move about in an
open-ﬁeld environment (4 3 5 m) in order to complete a
match-to-location task (Fig. 5). Moreover, in some of their
experiments the authors made an explicit attempt to control
for the different spatial frames of reference available to the
monkeys performing the tasks, as described below.
In a ﬁrst experiment, monkeys performed a delayed-match-
ing-to-location task, always starting from the same location in
the open-ﬁeld environment. The task employed four identical
potentially rewarded locations (inverted ﬂower pots), with one
trial-unique location rewarded on each trial. During the sample
phase, monkeys were allowed to search among the four forag-
ing sites until they located the hidden food. After ﬁnding the
rewarded site, monkeys were allowed to take only a portion of
the food before being pulled back to the start location (note
that monkeys were not allowed to search any of the other
potentially rewarded locations once they had found the food).
In the test phase (following a 5-min or 4-h delay), monkeys
FIGURE 5. Schematic representation of the open-ﬁeld delayed-
matching-to-location task developed by Hampton et al. (2004).
During the sample phase, monkeys were allowed to search for
food among several potentially rewarded locations and take part of
the food reward before being pulled back to the start location.
During the test phase, monkeys were allowed to search for the
remaining of the food. (A) Monkeys start from the same location
in the room during the sample and test phases (‘‘same’’ trials). (B)
Monkey start from a different, opposite location in the room dur-
ing sample and test phases (‘‘switch’’ trials). Note that in both con-
ditions, an egocentric frame of reference enables the encoding of
and memory for the location of the reward at the center of the
array. See main text for a detailed description of the procedure.
[Color ﬁgure can be viewed in the online issue, which is available
at www.interscience.wiley.com.]
7
ht
tp
://
do
c.
re
ro
.c
h
were allowed to search until they found the remaining food
located where they had found it originally. Each monkey
participated in 25 trials (1 trial/day, 5- to 6-days/week).
Hampton et al. showed that the performance of hippocam-
pal-lesioned monkeys did not differ between sample and test
phases. Unfortunately, however, although control monkeys per-
formed slightly above chance, they did not exhibit robust
match-to-location performance at either 5 min or 4 h (NB:
This poor performance might be explained by the fact that
monkeys were not allowed to search all potentially rewarded
locations in the sample phase). Although the lack of a robust
performance from the control monkeys makes the results of
this experiment difﬁcult to interpret, it is nevertheless clear that
because monkeys always began their searches from the same
location, both egocentric and allocentric representations of
space could be used to encode the location of the reward. The
fact that hippocampal-lesioned animals did not perform above
chance cannot be taken as evidence that they were incapable of
using an egocentric (hippocampus-independent) representation
of space to solve the task, but only that egocentric representa-
tions are insufﬁcient to sustain spatial memory performance
over extended periods of time (5 min in this task), as previ-
ously discussed.
Indeed, this hypothesis regarding the time-dependent nature
of egocentric representation was further supported by a second
experiment, which introduced various delays to a trial-unique
match-to-location task. There were four major differences with
Experiment 1 including: (1) the addition of shorter delays (1,
2, 3, 4, 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, and 30 min), (2) trial-unique conﬁg-
urations of three foraging sites, (3) a clearly visible reward at
the target site during the sample phase, and (4) two or three
trials per day. As before, however, monkeys always started the
task from the same location. For this series of experiments, all
ﬁve control monkeys performed the task with delays up to 10
min and two control monkeys succeeded with delays of 30
min. Interestingly, although one of the six hippocampal-
lesioned monkeys failed to reach an arbitrary criterion of 81%
accuracy during a pretraining stage with a 30-s delay, four of
the monkeys were able to perform the task following a 1-min
delay, and one monkey was even able to perform the task fol-
lowing a 5-min delay. Although this experiment did not control
for the presence of egocentric and allocentric spatial frames of
reference (i.e., both frames of reference were available to solve
the task), it demonstrated that hippocampal-lesioned monkeys
could succeed at shorter delay intervals (i.e., shorter intervals
compared to controls), suggesting that egocentric representa-
tions are insufﬁcient to sustain spatial memory performance
over extended periods of time.
In Experiments 3 and 4, Hampton et al. attempted to con-
trol for the different spatial frames of reference that monkeys
could use to solve their task by introducing two different start
locations in the test phase (Fig. 5). Monkeys were tested with
three foraging sites and a 1-min delay between sample and test
phases. Now during the test phase, however, monkeys could
either be released to start searching from the same side of the
room as they had experienced during the sample phase (‘‘same’’
trials; Fig. 5A), or they could be released to start searching
from the opposite side of the room from which they had expe-
rienced during the sample phase (‘‘switch’’ trials; Fig. 5B). The
authors predicted that control monkeys would be able to ﬁnd
the reward in both the same and the switch trials, whereas hip-
pocampal-lesioned monkeys should be able to ﬁnd the reward
during the same, but not the switch trials. Unfortunately, how-
ever, the control monkeys’ performance did not differ from
that of hippocampal-lesioned monkeys during either the same
or the switch trials. Performance of both groups of monkeys
decreased during switch trials, as compared to same trials, but
nevertheless remained above chance level, even for the hippo-
campal-lesioned monkeys.
If an allocentric, relational representation of space is neces-
sary to solve the task by Hampton et al. in the switch condi-
tion, a presumably relational task, then the better than chance
performance of the hippocampal-lesioned animals is particularly
surprising. However, a closer look at the task indicates that an
allocentric, relational representation of space is not necessary to
perform above chance (Fig. 5). As before, an egocentric coding
of space could enable a subject to perform at above chance lev-
els even in the switch trials if one designates the three foraging
sites as left, center, and right. Then, regardless of whether one
starts at the same location, or at the opposite (switch) location
in the test trial, the site at the center of the conﬁguration can
always be encoded and remembered as the center location.
Consequently, when the center location is rewarded (i.e., 33%
of the trials), monkeys can use a preserved egocentric spatial
representation to remember its location, and can therefore be
correct on one-third of the trials. During the other two-thirds
of trials (when either the left or the right locations are
rewarded), monkeys have a 50% chance of being correct when
starting in the switch condition by simply choosing randomly
between left and right (here, monkeys need only to remember
‘‘not center’’ to be correct on 50% of the trials). Thus, if one
calculates the probability for all three types of trials together,
monkeys have a 66% chance of being correct when simply rely-
ing on an egocentric representation of space [(1/3 3 100%) 1
(2/3 3 50%) 5 66%]. Interestingly, this is exactly the per-
formance observed for one hippocampal-lesioned monkey
(‘‘Sm’’) in the ‘‘switch’’ condition. Note also that this monkey
performed at 100% correct in the ‘‘same’’ condition, and that
it also happened to be the best performer among hippocampal-
lesioned monkeys in Experiments 1 and 2. Moreover, the poor
performance of control monkeys on the switch trials (i.e., an
average of 45% correct) may similarly be explained by reliance
on an egocentric strategy.
In sum, the experiments by Hampton et al. not only failed
to distinguish controls from hippocampal-lesioned monkeys
(Experiments 1, 3, and 4) and to preclude monkeys from rely-
ing on an egocentric spatial frame of reference (Experiment 4),
but also failed to demonstrate that normal monkeys were rely-
ing on an allocentric representation of space to solve their
open-ﬁeld task (Experiments 3 and 4). In fact the data suggest
that, in contrast to what the authors claim, some control mon-
keys were indeed relying on an egocentric strategy to solve the
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task. Thus, although their study attempted to address the issue
of egocentric versus allocentric spatial representations, it
remained inconclusive with respect to the role of the monkey
hippocampus in the establishment or use of allocentric, spatial
relational representations of the environment.
Hampton et al. (2004) discussed previously reported differ-
ences between spatial memory studies based on the use of
large-scale versus small-scale environments: ‘‘One possible rea-
son for the preponderance of negative ﬁndings [for a role of
the hippocampus in spatial learning and memory] in nonhu-
man primates is that the tests used with monkeys differ dra-
matically in relative spatial scale from those used with rodents
and birds. In contrast with the tests with smaller animals, mon-
keys were not required to navigate through space in a testing
arena many times their own body size, but rather responded by
reaching out to the test stimuli from a single body position.’’
Although at the end they concluded that the size of the testing
environment could not explain the inconsistent results of previ-
ous studies, they themselves did not provide a clear explana-
tion. We believe that the only critical factor explaining the dis-
crepancy between the previous studies, as alluded to by Hamp-
ton et al., is the fact that monkeys were only able to respond
by reaching out to the test stimuli from a single body position.
In other words, both normal and hippocampal-lesioned mon-
keys could rely on egocentric representations of space to guide
their behavior, which, as we have just discussed, was also the
case in the experiments by Hampton et al. (2004), irrespective
of the scale of the environment.
THE OPEN-FIELD FORAGING PARADIGM
We have recently developed and implemented a novel experi-
mental paradigm to clarify the role of the monkey hippocam-
pus in allocentric, spatial relational learning and memory
(Banta Lavenex et al., 2006; Lavenex and Banta Lavenex, 2006;
Lavenex et al., 2007b). As discussed previously, we believed
that it was imperative to test monkeys in conditions that clearly
distinguish between egocentric (viewpoint-dependent) and allo-
centric (viewpoint-independent) representations of space.
Accordingly, our task, a paradigm previously designed to study
spatial learning and memory in rodents (Lavenex and Schenk,
1995, 1996, 1997, 1998; Lavenex et al., 1998), explicitly pre-
cludes the ability of monkeys to rely on an egocentric strategy
to solve the task, as we will describe.
Our task is a foraging task, in which monkeys can freely
search for food in an open-ﬁeld environment (Fig. 6). From
within the arena, monkeys have visual access to surrounding
environmental cues. They forage for preferred food items (e.g.,
grapes, marshmallows) that are located in two different arrays
of three distinct locations (gray circles in Figs. 6A,B). Monkeys
behave freely without any negative reinforcement to shape their
behavior. They have 5 min to ﬁnd all three rewarded locations,
and are free to explore the arena for 30 s after they have found
all three rewards [which reduces the animal’s drive to explore
the environment before choosing the rewarded locations (Lav-
enex and Schenk, 1995, 1997, 1998; Lavenex et al., 1998)].
There are two critical features of our task that prevent monkeys
from using an egocentric strategy to solve the task. First, within
the testing arena, 18 regularly arranged inverted cups serve as
potential goal locations (although only six of these locations
ever contain food; NB: This paradigm thus does not penalize a
win-stay strategy). Second, on each trial, the monkey enters the
arena from one of four pseudorandomly chosen entrance points
(located at the four corners of the arena). Thus, the combina-
tion of multiple goal locations and four entrance points explic-
itly precludes the ability of monkeys to rely on an egocentric
strategy to identify the rewarded locations. Speciﬁcally, as illus-
trated in Figure 6A, the performance of a monkey that employs
an egocentric, viewpoint-dependent strategy (e.g., second cup
on the left) after entering the arena will not choose potentially
rewarded locations (gray circles) more frequently than never-
rewarded locations (white circles). In contrast, monkeys that
employ an allocentric, spatial relational strategy (viewpoint-in-
dependent) will correctly choose potentially rewarded locations
(Fig. 6B).
Our experiment includes two different conditions: a local
cue condition and a spatial relational condition. In the local
cue condition (Fig. 6C), rewarded locations are marked by red-
and blue-colored cups, so that monkeys can use either local
cues or spatial relational information to discriminate the food
locations. In the spatial relational condition (Fig. 6D),
rewarded locations are covered with the same neutral-colored
cups as all other locations (i.e., no local cues mark the food
locations), so that monkeys must rely on a spatial relational
representation of the environment to discriminate these loca-
tions. In other words, monkeys must form and utilize an allo-
centric representation of space that codes the goal locations in
relation to distant environmental cues (Fig. 6B), the very deﬁ-
nition of spatial relational memory. Again, the combination of
multiple goal locations and four pseudorandomly chosen en-
trance points precludes the ability of monkeys to rely on an
egocentric strategy to identify the rewarded locations (Fig. 6A).
We summarize here the results of one of our studies that
investigated the role of the monkey hippocampus in allocentric,
spatial relational learning and memory (Banta Lavenex et al.,
2006). We compared the individual behavior of six monkeys
that had received experimental lesion of the hippocampus in
adulthood with that of six monkeys that had undergone sham
surgery. We found that, as predicted, all hippocampal-lesioned
and all sham-operated monkeys preferentially chose the
rewarded locations when they were marked by local cues, that
is, red and blue cups (Fig. 6C). In contrast, none of the six
hippocampal-lesioned monkeys, as compared to ﬁve of six
sham-operated control monkeys, preferentially chose the
rewarded locations in absence of local cues marking these loca-
tions (Fig. 6D). Most interestingly, histological analysis of the
brain of the sixth control monkey that was not able to prefer-
entially choose the rewarded locations in the spatial relational
condition revealed nonexperimentally induced bilateral damage
completely conﬁned to the hippocampus (CA regions). More-
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over, the behavior of this monkey in the spatial relational con-
dition (i.e., his location choices) was indistinguishable from
that of the experimentally lesioned monkeys (Banta Lavenex
et al., 2006).
Why do the results of our experiment investigating the role
of the monkey hippocampus in spatial memory differ so drasti-
cally from the experiments described above? First, because nor-
mal monkeys have a natural ability to use both egocentric and
allocentric strategies to solve spatial tasks, we have speciﬁcally
designed our task to prevent monkeys from relying on egocen-
tric strategies to discriminate the food locations. Our results
show that once the information provided by an egocentric
frame of reference is made unreliable, hippocampal-lesioned
monkeys, who are unable to rely on an allocentric spatial frame
of reference, are completely unable to preferentially choose
rewarded locations in the absence of local cues marking these
locations. Moreover, it is important to recognize that lesioned
monkeys were not simply ‘‘impaired’’ in their ability to prefer-
entially choose the rewarded locations (i.e., it is not the case
that control monkeys were 90% correct and lesioned monkeys
were 65% right, but still signiﬁcantly above chance), but rather
their choices did not differ from chance. Restricted hippocam-
pal lesion prevented allocentric, spatial relational processing
entirely, in every single lesioned animal. In contrast, all control
animals solved the task by making choices that were clearly
guided by an allocentric representation of space (Banta Lavenex
et al., 2006).
Finally, we would like to note that the effects of selective
damage to the hippocampus that we have described pertain
only to individuals lesioned in adulthood. In another series of
experiments employing this identical open-ﬁeld task, we found
that spatial relational learning in this paradigm persists follow-
ing neonatal hippocampal lesions in macaque monkeys (Lav-
enex et al., 2007b). This surprising result thus suggests that
early, but not late, hippocampal damage leads to functional
brain reorganization that enables spatial information to be
acquired through the use of brain regions that normally do not
subserve this function. These latter ﬁndings further emphasize
FIGURE 6. Schematic representation of the open-ﬁeld experi-
mental design developed by Lavenex and Banta Lavenex (2006).
Monkeys forage freely for preferred food located in two different
arrays of three distinct locations. (A) An egocentric strategy (view-
point-dependent) does not enable the discrimination of potentially
rewarded locations (gray circle) and never-rewarded locations
(white circle). (B) An allocentric, spatial relational strategy (view-
point-independent) enables the discrimination of potentially
rewarded locations (gray circles) from never-rewarded locations
(white circles). See main text for a detailed description of the pro-
cedure. (C) Local cue condition: red and blue cups mark the
potentially rewarded locations. Both normal and hippocampal-
lesioned monkeys are able to identify rewarded locations in this
condition. (D) Spatial relational condition: all locations are cov-
ered by the same neutral-colored cups. Control animals are capa-
ble of identifying rewarded locations, whereas hippocampal-
lesioned animals are incapable of identifying rewarded locations.
See main text for a detailed description of the procedure and
results. [Color ﬁgure can be viewed in the online issue, which is
available at www.interscience.wiley.com.]
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the need for systematic studies of the structural and functional
maturation of the primate hippocampal formation in order to
gain insight into the speciﬁc types of information processing
that are subserved by the medial temporal lobe structures at
different developmental stages (Lavenex et al., 2007a).
DISCUSSION
In this commentary, we have explained in detail how previ-
ous studies investigating the role of the monkey hippocampus
in spatial learning and memory have produced inconsistent
results, because the tasks that have been employed can be
solved by using egocentric (hippocampal-independent) as well
as allocentric (hippocampal-dependent) representations of
space. Moreover, we have described how previous ﬁndings sug-
gesting that the monkey hippocampus is not critical for spatial
memory processes at shorter delays can be explained by the
preserved ability of hippocampal-lesioned monkeys to rely on
egocentric spatial representations over short time delays. These
egocentric representations, however, are not maintained over
long periods of time and thus do not sustain performance over
long delays. In contrast, we have unequivocally shown, in a
task that precludes the use of egocentric strategies, that the
monkey hippocampus is critical for the establishment or use of
allocentric, spatial relational representations of the environ-
ment. In sum, it can be concluded that the role of the hippo-
campus in spatial learning and memory is conserved among
vertebrates, including nonhuman primates.
In light of the arguments developed in this commentary, we
propose that the following criteria be adopted by researchers,
and considered by readers and reviewers alike when evaluating
contributions to the literature. First, use of the words ‘‘space’’
or ‘‘spatial’’ must be qualiﬁed. It is clear that not all space is
created equal. Studies of spatial memory should thus clearly
deﬁne the speciﬁc kind(s) of spatial representation(s) being
tested (e.g., egocentric vs. allocentric), so that the reader can
both evaluate the experimental design as well as make predic-
tions about how different brain structures contribute to the
elaboration and use of distinct spatial representations.
Second, experiments that aim to assess allocentric, spatial
relational memory must be designed in a manner that pre-
cludes subjects from using egocentric spatial frames of reference
to solve the task. Speciﬁcally, any task in which subjects always
approach a testing apparatus from the same direction cannot
rid the task of its egocentric component, and therefore cannot
be considered purely spatial relational. However, just changing
the position from which the animal approaches the task is not
a fool-proof solution. Egocentric strategies can still be used efﬁ-
ciently from novel start locations, if the task requires animals
to discriminate only one to a few goal locations, as we
described above.
Finally, although this commentary has been written with an
emphasis on current investigations of the role of the hippocam-
pus in spatial relational memory in monkeys, it is obvious that
the ideas we have presented are valid for investigations of spa-
tial relational memory in all species, from rodents to humans.
However, we believe that by incorporating these suggestions
into the current investigations of hippocampal function in non-
human primates that this domain can ﬁnally achieve concensus
with ﬁndings from other species, and contribute to the
advancement of our overall understanding of hippocampal
function.
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